Functionalism

The claim made by functionalists is that what really is relevant in the mind and body problem is the functional role played by the hardware, which in case of humans happen to be brain, and in case of a machine, say computer it is the embedded structure of thousands of micro transistors. To analyze this claim in more depth let us first go back to from where we started – Cartesian’s Dualism, and then we shall come all the way arriving at the theory of functionalism.

In his theory of Dualism, Rein Descartes proposed that there exists a duality of mind and body – the first mind and the other being body! The latter he said is material or physical. What Descartes meant by physical was explained by him as follows: something which exists in the three dimensional space, i.e. which extends in space and also in time. It exists in space because it is matter and occupies space. By hypothesis of natural sciences then, given a material (physical) object existing in a region in space at a particular time, no other material object can occupy the same space at the same time(s). Now that we have a definition for time which claims the same to be relative, and this definition has also been verified against experiments, it seems obvious that this should lead to a complete downfall of the distinction between physical and non physical. However, it is not so. Even though time is relative it is not possible for an observer, no matter in which frame he is standing, to be able to spot two material objects at the same coordinates at the same time. Hence we have quite easily been able to come over this problem. Now to make our theory of dualism also compatible with the modern quantum mechanics equation which claim even energy to be some form of particles – particles which are mass-less and travel at the s[peed of light and are hence not matter or material objects to say the least. This does put a question mark on the issue of what is physical and what is not. We know that the unlike matter, energy does not follow the constraint of not being able to be present at the same coordinates at same time, even though it is quantized. Hence, let us relax the definition of physical to something which obeys the laws or axioms of nature, and which can be explained by the mathematical equations given by science. Then mind consists of thoughts – which cannot be brought down on paper and pen in the form of an equation and which follow no laws. Let us call this ‘the modern day theory of dualism’. However, quite obvious as it seems is that our thoughts bear a causal relationship with our actions. Now, this is a big blow to the philosophy of natural sciences. This would imply that apart form the natural laws which apparently govern nature, there exists another factor which cannot be quantified and which governs the happenings in our world. Yet, how accurately our laws predict the working of a rocket and that of our wrist watch. Hence we see that making the definition of physical compatible with present day Physics does not help dualism get rid of its earlier problem. Assumption of non physical distinct from physical has again got into trouble with science. It seems that there is something inherently wrong with this distinction. Perhaps, there is no distinction! Let us abandon this theory and move on to Identity theory. Considering the theory of epiphenomenalism is as good as considering the Identity theory and later on associating with the laws of science some factors which are non causal but exist. However, to detect the existence, interaction is needed, and interaction is just what we name as causality. Therefore, the concept of a non causal mind is even more absurd.

Now coming to Identity theory, let us directly jump over to the token identity theory. If we restrict ourselves to the type identity theory, it would mean that we are depriving any other being, if it exists, of the feelings we humans have and share. However, this is not the main concern as one could argue that perhaps yes! Any being without the same neuro-physiological composition as ours cannot experience emotions. But considering that just like us, even animals are capable of feeling pain. Now arguing that even though our neuro-physiological composition is not same as say that of a dog, both of us are capable of feeling pain. Then what is it that limits this difference only to the extent to which we are different form a dog? Nothing. If this is minor to us, than difference between the hardware of a human and a person from Mars could perhaps be minor to another higher being – just like difference between an abacus and a simple calculator made of transistors is minor to us. However here there is a point which the token identity theory and also the theory of functionalism overlook, and which we shall consider a little later. So, going by this argument, there is no reason why we should limit the identity between the feeling/thought and the hardware only till species having a neuro-physiological composition. This is precisely what token identity theory is. It says that the software is identical to hardware, i.e. in our case our mind is identical with our brain. Now here the dualists strike back with some valid arguments which are not being discussed here.

Finally, the functionalists say that we should rise above the petty issue of physical and non physical and discuss the problem in terms of the functionality of the object, without any reference to its ontology. However, please note that the theory of functionalism is answering an entirely different question from what the earlier two (four) theories were trying to answer. Functionalism says that the object be analyzed in terms of the role it plays. On a first account, the theory seems just too obvious to be even considered. However, functionalists say that even though the token identity theorists were able to explain the apparent paradox of the incapability of another being to be able to feel, but they do so only at the cost of remaining silent on a very important question. What is it that is common in the nervous system of a human, and say the mercury flowing in the veins of a Martian which allows both of them to share the very same feeling? How is it that two material objects appearing entirely different at the material level are able to realize the same feeling? The functionalists proceed to claim this thing to be the functional role. It is at the functional level, a level higher than the material level of objects, where the explanation to this problem of mind and body lies. But barely. The functionalists while drawing an analogy from objects like knife and computers forgot that there exists an agent – namely we the humans – who assign the role and meaning to that role in each of the examples the functionalists quote. There is no similarity what-so-ever between the five beads on a wire of an abacus and five volts at the terminal of the transistor unless there is a human to assign meanings to these quantities. A car is in no way similar to a bullock cart unless there is human to realize that both can be used for the same purpose of transport and hence they have the same functional role. We need an agent to prescribe roles and their meaning without ‘whom’ the whole theory of functionalism is absolutely absurd. So the question is that who is the agent, or rather what is the agent in our case? This is not an irrelevant question. For when talking in terms of higher concepts like functional roles, one cannot neglect the method used to assign meaning to that functional role. I understand that when only first two segments of the LCD in my calculator glow it is supposed to mean something which I understand as one. If I raise a finger, I understand that it denotes one, and so does the person to whom I am signaling this. We have a common understating or for the want of a better term, a protocol of what stands for what! Now if there is a C-fiber firing in the extreme right portion of my brain, and there is a fractal structure being formed by the mercury atoms inside the Martian, who is to tell us both that we are supposed to identify this as pain? If it is we ourselves, then hardware serves as no more than a signaling device to a conscious ‘me’. This is going back to dualism. At this point the functionalists could argue that we may still consider the functional role of objects irrespective of the agent assigning meaning to these roles. However, the question remains lurking and considering functional roles in absence of any explanation for the method being used for the assignment of roles is as absurd as dualism and identity theory seems to the functionalists. Hence, functionalists may talk in terms of functional role, but they do so only by remaining silent on a very important question. ‘What’ is the agent?